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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wayne Albert Webb appeals from the judgment and conviction entered on
his plea of guilty to misdemeanor battery. Webb argues the district court abused
its discretion in imposing two years of probation with the requirement that he
attend 52 weeks of domestic violence counseling, and requiring Webb to pay
$1,529.46 in restitution to the victim.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state initially charged Webb with one count of felony kidnapping or
false imprisonment, one count of felony aggravated assault, and one count of
felony domestic battery - traumatic injury.
Webb's then-girlfriend, Launie Johnston.

(R., pp. 10-12.)

The victim was

(R., pp. 11-12, 54-55.)

The case

proceeded to trial, and the jury found Webb not guilty of both kidnapping / false
imprisonment and aggravated assault, but was unable to reach a verdict on the
domestic battery charge. (R., pp. 172-73.) On that charge, the court set a new
date for trial. (R., pp. 174, 176.)
Before trial, Webb entered an Alford1 plea of guilty, per negotiations with
the state, to the reduced charge of misdemeanor battery. (R., p. 177.) The state
further agreed to recommend a sentence of 180 days with credit for two days
served and the balance to be suspended, a $500 fine, and two years' probation.
(R., pp. 177-78.) After taking Webb's plea, the district court ordered Webb to

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

1

undergo domestic violence and substance abuse evaluations at county expense.
(R., pp. 178, 182.)
Before sentencing, the state filed a Restitution Request for the victim,
Launie Johnston, totaling $1,529.46, for lost wages, mileage, and other
expenses incurred to attend court proceedings. (R., pp. 183-88.) Webb filed no
objection.
At sentencing, Webb's counsel stated, "we would ask that this court follow
the recommendation of probation and place him on the two years of probation."
(Tr., p. 7, Ls. 10-12.) The district court imposed the sentence Webb requested,
and ordered $2,029.46 in restitution, "1,529.46 for Ms. Johnson and $500 to
Jerome County for the domestic violence evaluation." (Tr., p. 9, L. 16-25; R., pp.
192-94.) In addition, among other terms, the court ordered "the defendant shall
complete

a

52-week

domestic

violence

program

and

follow

all

other

recommendations as contained within the domestic violence evaluation." (Tr., p.
10, Ls. 8-11.) Webb timely appealed his judgment and order of restitution. (R.,
pp. 206-08.)

2

ISSUES
Webb states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it imposed
two (2) years of probation that required Mr. Webb to
complete a 52 week domestic violence class.

2.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it required
Mr. Webb to pay restitution to Launie Webb [sic] in the
amount of $1,529.46.

(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Applying the correct standard of review, and in light of the record, has
Webb failed to demonstrate a legal basis for this Court to disturb the
requirement that he attend domestic violence counseling?

2.

Has Webb failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
awarding restitution to the victim?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Applying The Correct Standard Of Review, And In Light Of The Record, Webb
Has Failed To Demonstrate A Legal Basis For This Court To Disturb The
Requirement That He Attend Domestic Violence Counseling

A.

Introduction
argues the district court abused its discretion by requiring that he

complete 52 weeKs

domestic violence counseling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-4.)

According to Webb, the 52 vveeKs

counseling, recommended in Webb's

domestic violence assessment, is an excessive sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.
3-4.)

Webb's argument fails because the requirement to attend domestic

violence counseling is not a sentence, but a term of probation to which he did not
object, and in fact agreed at sentencing.

Further, Webb cannot show a legal

basis to disturb the requirement, on review of the facts and under applicable law.
B.

Webb Did Not Object And Thus Failed To Preserve A Challenge To The
Terms Of His Probation
As an initial matter, "[a] challenge to the validity of a probation term that

was not raised before the district court will not be considered on appeal." State
v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 530, 20 P.3d 709, 714 (Ct. App. 2001). At Webb's
sentencing, the district court ordered two years of probation, and required among other terms - that "[t]he defendant shall complete a 52-week domestic
violence program and follow all other recommendations as contained within the
domestic violence evaluation." (Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 10, L. 16.) The court then
asked, "Sir, are you able to comply with those terms?" and Webb responded,
"Yes, sir." (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 21-23.) Because Webb did not object to the domestic

4

violence counseling, this Court need not consider the issue.

But even if the

Court were to consider the argument, Webb cannot show the district court erred
in requiring domestic violence counseling as a term of Webb's probation.
C.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court "exercises free review over the application and

construction of statutes." State v. Dicksen, 153 Idaho 70, 73, 266 P.3d 1175,
1178 (Ct. App. 2011 ). This includes review over the trial court's application of
I.C. § 19-2601, regarding the power to order probation.

State v. Wardle, 137

Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 2002).
D.

Webb Has Not Shown That Domestic Violence Counseling Is An
Unreasonable Term Of Probation
A trial court is authorized to impose terms and conditions of probation "as

it deems necessary and expedient," under I.C. § 19-2601 (2). See Wardle, 137
Idaho at 810, 53 P.3d at 1229.

Although a trial court's discretion to impose

terms of probation is broad, such terms "must be reasonably related to the
rehabilitative and public safety goals of probation."

~

(citing State v. Gawron,

112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)) (other citations omitted).
"Whether the terms and conditions of a defendant's probation are reasonably
related to the goals of probation is a legal question over which [the appellate
courts] exercise free review."

~

(citing State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318, 847

P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App. 1993)).
Importantly, Webb has cited no legal authority to support his assertion
that domestic violence counseling was an unreasonable term of probation.

5

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)

"When issues on appeal are not supported by

propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered." State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (citing I.AR. 35) (other
citation omitted).

Under Zichko, Webb's challenge to the district court's order

requiring him to attend domestic violence counseling should be rejected.
In addition to providing no legal support for his argument, Webb also fails
to demonstrate a factual basis. The court ordered the 52 sessions of domestic
violence counseling upon recommendation by Eric Jones, PhD., who conducted
Webb's court-ordered domestic violence assessment.
Jones Assessment.)

(Tr., p. 3, Ls. 22-24;

In the assessment's concluding section, Jones cited

Webb's "history of repeated allegations of domestic battery, with a couple
convictions," noting, "[t]he fact the history is fairly recent is cause for great
concern particularly since [Webb] doesn't acknowledge these incidents." (Jones
Assessment, p. 10.) This is supported throughout the assessment in Webb's
responses, which demonstrate Webb's denial or minimization of responsibility for
incidents of domestic violence. (Jones Assessment, pp. 2-3, 5-7.) About this,
Jones observed, "[Webb] appears disconnected from the reality of his abuse
behavior and needs help to correct this or his reactive conduct may lead to lethal
outcomes in future relationships."

(Jones Assessment, p.

10.)

Jones

commented, "Webb has never received domestic violence treatment despite his
history of charges and convictions," and therefore recommended that Webb
"complete a 52 session domestic violence program." (Jones Assessment, p. 10.)

6

The domestic violence counseling

ordered

by the court squarely

addresses rehabilitation and protection of society, and is thus a reasonable and
appropriate term of probation. Wardle, 137 Idaho at 810, 53 P.3d at 1229. This
Court should therefore reject Webb's argument.

11.
Webb Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Its
Order Of Restitution To The Victim
A.

Introduction
Webb asserts the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution

to Launie Johnston totaling $1,529.46. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5.) According to
Webb, "the record is devoid of any information related to why restitution was
ordered."

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

Webb further argues that Johnston's

expenses were for travel to and from a trial which did not result in a conviction,
and were therefore improper as restitution. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Because the
record substantially supports that Johnston's travel expenses and lost wages
were proximately caused by the crime for which Webb pleaded guilty, the court's
order of restitution was appropriate.
B.

Standard Of Review
The district court has discretion at sentencing "to determine whether

restitution is appropriate and, if so, to set the amount." State v. Houser, 155
Idaho 521, _, 314 P.3d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). The court
determines the amount of economic loss suffered by and to be awarded to the
crime victim "upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the trial court by
the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator."

7

State v.

Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C. §
19-5304(6)). Factual findings by the sentencing court as to restitution "will not be
disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Straub, 153
Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013) (citing State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho
599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011)).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."

kl

(citation omitted). The Court on appeal "will not overturn an order of restitution
unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822, 242 P.3d
at 192 (citation omitted).

C.

The Record Supports That Johnston's Economic Losses Were
Proximately Caused By The Crime For Which Webb Pleaded Guilty
Webb first argues the record lacks information about why restitution was

ordered. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Contrary to Webb's argument, the prosecution
submitted a restitution request and supporting documentation, asking for
$1,529.46 for the victim Johnston, for lost wages, mileage, meals while traveling,
and lodging, incurred to attend the pretrial and trial. (R., pp. 183-88.) Per I.C. §
19-5304(6), this "evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor" outlines the
basis for the restitution ordered. Although the court did not specifically mention
its consideration of the prosecution's request and documentation, the restitution
amount ordered precisely matches the amount in the request. Therefore, it is
reasonable to infer that the court determined the restitution amount based on this
substantial evidence in the record. See Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at
276.

8

Webb also points out that he was not convicted of any charges in the trial
that Johnston attended. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Webb thus suggests that there
is no causal link between Johnston's losses and his criminal conduct. Restitution
may be ordered for a victim's economic loss or injury "only if there is a causal
connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the
loss suffered by the victim." State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495, 283 P.3d
808, 812 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401).
Causation includes actual and proximate cause.

kl

"[P]roximate cause deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that
the loss would flow from the criminal conduct."

kl

"The proximate cause inquiry

requires a court to determine" if the losses at issue were "so highly unusual 'that
a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his
conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected"' them to be
incurred.

Id.

A defendant is liable for restitution "if either the possible

consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant
should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his
act." Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 207.
A trial court will not typically award restitution for losses "actually and
proximately caused only by ... offenses for which the charges were dismissed."

kl

However, Webb's trial addressed three counts, only two of which resulted in

acquittals. (R., pp. 172-73.) On the third count, the jury did not reach a verdict.
(R., p. 122-23.) It was as to this third count - the domestic battery charge - that

9

Webb entered a plea agreement, reducing the charge to misdemeanor battery in
exchange for his guilty plea. (R., pp. 177-78.)
It cannot reasonably be said that Johnston attended the pretrial and trial
only as to the two counts for which Webb was acquitted. As the victim of all the
charged conduct, Johnston attended proceedings as to all three counts against
Webb, including the battery charge to which he ultimately pied guilty. Criminal
proceedings - including the pretrial and trial - and the victim's attendance of
those proceedings, are foreseeable results of a defendant's criminal conduct.
See Houser, 155 Idaho at _, 314 P .3d at 210.

The record supports that

Johnston's expenses incurred due to her attendance at criminal proceedings in
this matter were reasonably foreseeable, and thus causally connected to Webb's
criminal conduct.

Webb has failed to show the court abused its discretion in

awarding restitution as requested by the prosecution.

Accordingly, Webb's

challenge to the order of restitution should be rejected.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order and judgment of conviction and restitution.
DATED this 20th day of February, 2014.

DAPHN1EJ.HijANG
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of February, 2014, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Stacey DePew
Jerome County Felony Public Defender
PO Box 9
Jerome, ID 83383

DA~
Deputy Attorney General
DJH/pm
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